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THE LEGALITY OF DE
FACTO SEGREGATION
CHARLES E. RICE*
T HERE ARE THREE BASIC FIELDS with which a discussion of racial segre-
gation must deal: education, employment and housing. Opinions will
vary as to which, if any, is paramount, but none will deny that they are
interrelated. In all three areas, the engines of legal proscription have
been brought to bear to eliminate affirmative, legally-sanctioned segrega-
tion. But there remains the stubborn fact that the removal of legal dis-
crimination has not been attended by either a resultant improvement in
the living conditions of minority groups or a substantial integration of
the races. The lack of causal connection between the elimination of legal
segregation and the betterment of racial relations is strikingly affirmed in
the northern states where, after a generation of freedom from affirmative
legal discriminations, we find some of the most perplexing problems of
ghettoization and limited opportunity in the entire nation. It is in recog-
nition of the disparity between legal equality and actual equality of
opportunity that attention has shifted from legal discrimination to de
facto segregation as the immediate object of correction. This article
will examine the posture of the law toward de facto segregation, with
three questions in mind: (1) has the Supreme Court of the United
States merely forbade legal segregation, or rather commanded integra-
tion? (2) apart from Supreme Court decisions, and as a matter of
constitutional analysis, must local authorities adopt measures designed
to eliminate de facto segregation? and (3) may the local authorities
do so if they choose?
The problem of de facto segregation arises in many forms through-
out the three principal areas of education, employment and housing
as well as in social and other relationships. Nevertheless, the relevant
issues have been developed most fully in the educational field. Analyt-
ically, we can gain from an examination of that field an over-all view
* A.B., College of the Holy Cross; LL.B., Boston College Law School; LL.M., New
New York University Law School; Associate Professor, Fordham University School
of Law.
of the operative principles and their po-
tential applications, which ought to obtain
in employment, housing and other areas
as well. This study, therefore, will attempt
to discover the ruling principles by primary
resort to the developments which have oc-
curred thus far in matters of education.
Brown v. Board of Education:
What Does It Require?
In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled un-
constitutional the maintenance of racially
segregated public schools. The cases were
Brown v. Board of Educ.,1 a consolidated
case incorporating actions from Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware,
in which Negro children sought court
orders to compel their admittance to pub-
lic elementary and secondary schools on
a non-segregated basis, and Boling v.
Sharpe,2 in which the same issue was raised
in relation to the public schools of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
In Brown v. Board of Educ., Mr. Chief
Justice Earl Warren said, on behalf of the
Court:
We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of "separate but
equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore,
we hold that the plaintiffs and others sim-
ilarly situated for whom the actions have
been brought are, by reason of the segre-
gation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The case of Boiling v. Sharpe, on the
other hand, presented no problem of
"equal protection of the laws." This was
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
3 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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so because the equal protection clause in
the fourteenth amendment binds only the
states, and there is no equal protection
clause, in so many words, restricting the
federal government. Rather, the Court in
Boiling, relying upon its decision that same
day in Brown, held that public school seg-
regation in the District of Columbia con-
stituted a denial of the due process of law
guaranteed by the fifth amendment, 4 which
does bind the federal government.
Incidentally, the Supreme Court in
Brown did not explicitly overrule the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Fer-
guson.5 Rather, the Court technically dis-
tinguished Plessy because, due to the con-
temporary role and importance of educa-
tion in comparison to the situation in
1896, segregation in schools "has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children"
through the generation in them of a "sense
of inferiority."' For this conclusion, the
Court relied upon findings of fact based
upon psychological and sociological evi-
dence7 rather than upon a general con-
demnation in principle of racial classifica-
tion.s
4 "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law....
5 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
O 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
7 But see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles O
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33
(1959), arguing that the decision "rested on the
view that racial segregation is, in principle, a
denial of equality to the minority against whom
it is directed .... See also Cahn, Jurisprudence,
30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955).
8 Commenting upon the Court's distinction of
Plessy, without a formal overruling of it, Judge
Learned Hand concluded: "I do not see how this
distinction can be reconciled with the notion that
racial equality is a paramount value that state
legislatures are not to appraise and whose inva-
sion is fatal to the validity of any statute." HAND,
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The main question here for our purpose
is whether the Court in Brown proscribed
segregation or commanded integration. A
reading of the opinion, especially in light
of the fact that the cases involved in Brown
all presented challenges to legally imposed
systems of segregation, leads to the con-
clusion that the proscription of segregation
was the essence of the decision. The ques-
tion was posed and answered by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, for the Court, in these
terms:
We come then to the question presented:
Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive
the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that
it does. 9
Segregation as the target was highlighted
in the following passages:
To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. 10
We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of "separate but
equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. 1
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958). The relevance,
and indeed the genuineness, of the social science
evidence in Brown has been seriously drawn into
question. Van den Haag, Social Science Testi-
mony In The Desegregation Cases-A Reply To
Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69
(1960); but see Clark, The Desegregation Cases:
Criticism Of The Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL.
L. REV. 224 (1960).
9 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
10 Id. at 494.
11 Id. at 495.
That no mandate of integration as such,
or racial balance, was implicit in the
Brown decision is evident from the final
disposition of the Kansas case on remand
to the United States District Court. In
implementing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, the district court rejected the argu-
ment that there is an affirmative duty on
the part of the defendant board of educa-
tion to integrate the races so as to promote
a racial balance in each of the various
schools in the system. Rather, the court
ruled:
It was stressed at the hearing that such
schools as Buchanan are all-colored schools
and that in them there is no intermingling
of colored and white children. Desegrega-
tion does not mean that there must be in-
termingling of the races in all school dis-
tricts. It means only that they may not be
prevented from intermingling or going to
school together because of race or color. 2
If it is a fact, as we understand it is, with
respect to Buchanan School that the dis-
trict is inhabited entirely by colored stu-
dents, no violation of any constitutional
right results because they are compelled
to attend the school in the district in which
they live.'9
It is apparent, therefore, that the Brown
decision itself merely invalidated the prac-
tice of compulsory segregation in public
schools. As one federal court observed in
1956:
It must be remembered that the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Brown v. Board of Education . . . do
not compel the mixing of the different
races in the public schools. No general
reshuffling of the pupils in any school sys-
tem has been commanded. The order of
that Court is simply that no child shall be
denied admission to a school on the basis
12 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955).
13 Id. at 470.
of race or color. Indeed, just so a child is
not through any form of compulsion or
pressure required to stay in a certain
school, or denied transfer to another
school, because of his race or color, the
school heads may allow the pupil, whether
white or Negro, to go to the same school
he would have attended in the absence of
the ruling of the Supreme Court. 14
Is Racial Balancing Mandatory?
The Brown decision itself, however, is
not conclusive on the question of racial
balancing, because the matter of de facto,
as opposed to legal, segregation was not
then before the Court. Nor has there been
any intervening determinative ruling by
the Supreme Court.15 The problem, in a
word, is whether the Supreme Court, when
it is presented with the question, will go
beyond Brown and hold that local authori-
ties must, or at least may, assign pupils
to schools on the basis of race in order to
eliminate racial imbalance.
There is no clear judicial support for the
proposition that a school board must
take action to eliminate racial imbalance
arising merely from neighborhood patterns.
And there is considerable authority in the
lower courts to the contrary. On the fur-
ther question, however, as to whether a
school board may act to eliminate such
imbalance, opinion is divided.
In Bell v. School City of Gary," the Court
ef Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed
with the defendant's contention that
14 Thompson v. County School Bd., 144 F. Supp.
239, 240 (E.D. Va.), afl'd, 240 F.2d 59 (4th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911 (1957).
15See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
Dist., 328 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir. 1964), and
cases cited therein.
16 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963).
10 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1964
"'there is no affirmative federal constitu-
tional duty to change innocently arrived
at school attendance districts by the mere
fact that shifts in population either in-
crease or decrease the percentage of either
Negro or white pupils.'" On the other
hand, of course, "segregation established
• . . by gerrymandering of school district
lines and transferring of white children"
away from the school they would normally
attend does violate the rule of the Brown
decision. 1 7 Moreover, there would seem to
be a denial of equal protection of the laws
also where an attendance area plan, which
results in an almost total concentration of
Negro pupils in one disproportionately small
district, is coupled with a rigid policy for-
bidding voluntary transfers by pupils
across the different attendance areas.' s In
the absence of such formal or informal
gerrymandering, however, the maintenance
of the neighborhood school system would
seem to be legitimate. The district court
in the Gary case dwelt upon this aspect in
language worth quoting at length:
The Court is of the opinion that a simple
definition of a segregated school, within
the context in which we are dealing, is a
school which a given student would be
otherwise eligible to attend, except for his
race or color, or, a school which a student
is compelled to attend because of his race
or color.
The neighborhood school which serves
the students within a prescribed district is
a long and well established institution in
American public school education. It is
almost universally used, particularly in
the larger school systems. It has many
social, cultural and administrative advan-
17 Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181,
192 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1961).
18 Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1964).
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tages which are apparent without enumera-
tion. With the use of the neighborhood
school districts in any school system with
a large and expanding percentage of Negro
population, it is almost inevitable that a
racial imbalance will result in certain
schools. Nevertheless, I have seen nothing
in the many cases dealing with the segre-
gation problem which leads me to believe
that the law requires that a school system
developed on the neighborhood school
plan, honestly and conscientiously con-
structed with no intention or purpose to
segregate the races, must be destroyed or
abandoned because the resulting effect is
to have a racial imbalance in certain
schools where the district is populated al-
most entirely by Negroes or whites. On the
other hand, there are many expressions to
the contrary, and these expressions lead
me to believe that racial balance in our
public schools is not constitutionally man-
dated. 19
Other federal courts have similarly re-
jected the contention that the rule of
Brown v. Board of Educ. requires a school
board to eliminate de facto school segre-
gation arising from neighborhood pat-
terns. 20 A Louisiana district court sum-
marized the matter neatly:
It must be borne in mind that there is no
law, nor is there any decision of any Court,
which requires integration of public
schools. The only requirement is that forced
segregation of the public school system
be abolished. There is certainly no prohibi-
tion against purely voluntary segregation.
Negro children have no constitutional
19 Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ind.), afi'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
20E.g., Lynch v. Kenston School Dist., 229 F.
Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Webb v. Board of
Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. 111. 1963); see
also Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 221 F. Supp.
968, 974 (W.D. Tenn. 1963); Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 509, 514 (E.D.
La. 1963).
right to the attendance of white children
with them in the public schools. Their con-
stitutional right to equal protection of the
laws is the right to stand equal before the
laws of the State; that is, to be treated
simply as individuals without regard to
race or color. 21
It is sometimes argued that Brown v.
Board of Educ. commanded, or at least
sanctioned, racial balancing in schools to
offset de facto residential segregation be-
cause the Supreme Court in that case ob-
served that "separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal." 22 Thus, it is said,
an unconstitutional deprivation of equal
educational facilities will exist so long as
the local authorities yield to neighborhood
patterns which dictate that schools shall
be in fact racially "separate." Such an
over-literal interpretation, however, can be
entertained only at the expense of a precise
understanding of the Brown case itself.
When, on May 31, 1955, the Supreme
Court rendered its supplemental decision,
spelling out the manner in which the origi-
nal Brown decision of May 17, 1954 must
be implemented, the Court declared that
the federal courts, in evaluating local com-
pliance with the desegregation mandate,
could consider:
. . . problems related to administration,
arising from the physical condition of the
school plant, the school transportation sys-
tem, personnel, revision of school districts
and attendance areas into compact units
to achieve a system of determining admis-
sion to the public schools on a nonracial
basis .... 23
It has been argued that the Supreme
21 Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd.,
219 F. Supp. 876, 884 (E.D. La. 1963).
2" 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
300-01 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
Court in this passage "meant that one of
the ways in which desegregation should be
carried out was within the framework of
'school districts and attendance areas' and
that this language constituted direct au-
thority for a Board of Education to take
into consideration race as one of the fac-
tors in the delineation of a school zone. 24
But the reliance upon this extract from the
second Brown decision to legitimize racial
balancing programs ignores the conclusive
fact that the end in view, in the Brown case
and in that very quote itself, was "a sys-
tem of determining admission to the pub-
lic schools on a nonracial basis."' 25 Thus,
far from establishing integration as an end
in itself, the Court ordered only that offi-
cial segregation be terminated, and spe-
cifically legitimized the maintenance of
"school districts and attendance areas" as
''compact units" designed to achieve a
"nonracial" system of admission to the
public schools. Racial balancing, no matter
how it is rationalized, is the very antithesis
of a "nonracial" admission policy.
Is Racial Balancing Permissible?
It is relatively easy to conclude that
Brown v. Board of Educ. does not im-
pose an affirmative, duty on local author-
ities to remove racial imbalance from
schools, where it has been innocently gen-
erated by patterns of neighborhood devel-
opment. The more difficult question, how-
ever, is whether the local authorities may
so act if they choose to do so. There have
been a few cases in which pupils or their
parents have sought to prevent the imple-
mentation of plans instituted by school
24 Balaban v. Rubin, 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 446-
47, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574, 582 (2d Dep't 1964).
25 Brown v. Board of Educ., supra note 23.
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authorities to lessen racial imbalance. But
the cases, while generally favorable to the
balancing programs, are not wholly con-
clusive. In Balaban v. Rubin'2 for exam-
ple, the New York Court of Appeals up-
held a decision by the New York City
Board of Education to 'build a new junior
high school, in order to relieve overcrowd-
ing in existing schools, on a site chosen
mainly for the reason that the location
would result in a school population "ap-
proximately one-third negro, one-third
Puerto Rican, and one-third non-Puerto
Rican white. ' 2- Had not the new school
(J.H.S. 275) been built, the complaining
white pupils would have gone to an exist-
ing school (J.H.S. 285) in what they as-
serted was their "neighborhood. '2 There-
fore, they maintained, they were being ex-
cluded from J.H.S. 285 on account of their
race, in violation of Section 3201 of the
New York Education Law, which provides
that "no person shall be refused admission
into or be excluded from any public
school in the state of New York on account
of race, creed, color or national origin."
The court of appeals rejected this conten-
tion, apparently on the ground that section
3201 was designed to prevent segregation,
not to inhibit the taking of steps to elim-
inate segregation. Also, the court con-
cluded that "the plan adopted and here
under attack . . . excludes no one from
any school .... 1"2 The basis for this last
conclusion apparently was the fact "that
26 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1964), petition for cert. filed, 33
U.S.L. WEEK 3095 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1964) (No. 350).
27 id. at 198, 199 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d
at 283.
28 Id. at 197, 199 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d
at 282.
29 Id. at 199, 199 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.2d
at 284.
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all the children scheduled for admittance
into J.H.S. 275 will be in their first year
of junior high school so that no one is
being transferred from one school to an-
other. '" 30 If this in fact were the basis for
the court's conclusion that the plan "ex-
cludes no one from any school," one
wonders why the court overlooked the
fact that section 3201 reads: "no person
shall be refused admission into or excluded
from any public school . . . on account of
race. . .. "31 Surely, the complaining pupils
were refused admission into J.H.S. 285 on
account of their race. The court of appeals
went on to rule that the plan was not "arbi-
trary, capricious or unreasonable." 32 Here,
the court was influenced by the special cir-
cumstance that "no child will have to travel
farther to new School 275 than he would
have to go to get to his 'neighborhood'
school. '33 Judge Van Voorhis filed a strong
dissent in Balaban in which he attacked the
racial balancing plan as
the reverse of anti-discrimination. The
principle of anti-discrimination is that each
person shall be treated without regard to
race, religion or national origin. It is dis-
crimination to admit a person because he
is a Negro or a Pole, Catholic, Anglo-
Saxon, Jew, and so on. If persons can
legally be admitted because they belong to
any of these groups, then they can be ex-
cluded for the same reason. Such a result
would be contrary to the equal protection
clause of the Federal and State Constitu-
tions . . as well as sections 313 and 3201
of the New York State Education Law,
30 Id. at 198-99, 199 N.E.2d at 377, 250 N.Y.S.
2d at 284.
31 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3201. (Emphasis added.)
32 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199, 199 N.E.2d 375, 377,
250 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1964).
33 1d. at 199, 199 N.E.2d at 377-78, 250 N.Y.S.
2d at 284.
section 40 of the Civil Rights Law and
section 290 of the Executive Law. This sig-
nifies more than that school boards cannot
be compelled to correct racial imbalance;
it means that they are not permitted to
do so by law if that involves admitting or
excluding groups on account of race, re-
ligion or national origin. If school children,
employees, tenants or others can be ad-
mitted because they are Negroes, they can
also be admitted because they are Aryans,
and they or other racial groups can be ex-
cluded on the same basis.
34
Section 313 of the Education Law, cited
by Judge Van Voorhis in his dissent, sets
forth the standard of color-blindness in
education:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the state that the American ideal of
equality of opportunity requires that stu-
dents, otherwise qualified, be admitted to
educational institutions without regard to
race, color, religion, creed or national ori-
gin, except that, with regard to religious
or denominational educational institutions,
students, otherwise qualified, shall have the
equal opportunity to attend therein without
discrimination because of race, color or
national origin.35
In Strippoli v. Bickal, 36 the appellate di-
vision upheld as not arbitrary, capricious
nor unreasonable a racial balancing plan
instituted by the Board of Education of
Rochester, even though it entailed busing
Negro pupils two and one-half miles from
their former school to a school which had
theretofore been one hundred per cent
white. Similarly, the Englewood, New Jer-
I 1 d. at 199-200, 199 N.E.2d at 378, 250 N.Y.S.
2d at 285.
'1 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 313(1).
36 21 App. Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th
Dep't 1964).
sey, Board of Education was sustained in
its reconstruction of school attendance
lines so as to reduce the concentration of
Negroes in one schoel. 3 7 In Vetere v.
Mitchell,3S the appellate division modified
a lower court ruling 9 that the racial bal-
ancing plan, instituted by the New York
State Commissioner of Education in the
Malverne-Lakeview School District on
Long Island, was a violation of the above
quoted Section 3201 of the New York
Education Law. The court relied upon
Balaban v. Rubin40 to support the conclu-
sion that "in a proper case efforts may be
made to correct racial imbalance ' 41 and
then proceeded to rule that the Commis-
sioner's decision was not arbitrary, capri-
cious nor unreasonable. Similarly, the New
York City Board of Education's school
pairing plan was upheld in Addabbo v.
Donovan,4 2 where the court acknowledged
that "the reduction of racial imbalance in
our public schools" was "a very important
-probably the most important-factor"
in the pairing plan. On the other hand, in
Blumberg v. Donovan,41 the New York
City balancing program was held "arbi-
trary and unreasonable" 4' in compelling
37 Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J.
1964).
38 21 App. Div. 2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d
Dep't 1964).
39 Application of Vetere, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245
N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
40 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L.
WEEK 3095 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1964) (No. 350).
41 21 App. Div. 2d 561, 564, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480,
483 (3d Dep't 1964).
42 43 Misc. 2d 621, 251 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
43 - N.Y.S.2d- (Sup. Ct. 1964).
44 Id. at -
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the transfer of petitioners' children, who
are of tender years (grades three to six)
and who now attend a school across the
street from where they live, to a school
approximately nine-tenths of a mile away,
to and from which, if they return home
for lunch, they must walk a total of about
four miles a day, and each of the four
times they make this trip must cross twelve
street intersections, including two heavily
trafficked streets. ... 4.
At this point, an evaluation of the per-
missibility of racial balancing requires a
resort to first principles. In 1896, the Su-
preme Court, in the landmark case of
Plessy v. Ferguson,46 decided that a Loui-
siana statute requiring the segregation of
the races on public carriers did not violate
the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice
John Marshall Harlan, grandfather of the
Justice of the same name who is now on
the Supreme Court, voiced a strong dissent
to the Plessy ruling. He urged that the
Constitution must be color-blind:
The white race deems itself to be the
dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in educa-
tion, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt
not, it will continue to be for all time,
if it remains true to its great heritage and
holds fast to the principles of constitu-
tional liberty. But in view of the Consti-
tution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here.
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are
equal before the law.47
Mr. Justice Harlan, in this dissent, pointed
up the issue, the determination of which
could shape the course of racial relations
41 Id. at - ; see also Di Sano v. Storandt, 43
Misc. 2d 272, 250 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
46 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
47 Id. at 559.
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in this country for generations to come.
The issue is whether we shall strive for a
color-blind society or accept one in which,
for some purposes, we officially sanction
an attitude of color-consciousness. In a
1963 case involving a Tennessee pupil
transfer plan which was designed to pro-
mote segregation, the Supreme Court of
the United States capsulized a history of
judicial animosity toward racial classifi-
cation:
Classifications based on race for purposes
of transfers between public schools, as
here, violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the
Court said in Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944),
racial classifications are "obviously irrel-
evant and invidious." The cases of this
Court reflect a variety of instances in
which racial classifications have been held
to be invalid, e.g., public parks and play-
grounds, Watson v. City of Memphis . . .
[373 U.S. 526] (1963); trespass convic-
tions, where local segregation ordinances
pre-empt private choice, Peterson v. City
of Greenville . . . [373 U.S. 244] (1963);
seating in courtrooms, Johnson v. Virginia
• . . [373 U.S. 61] (1963); restaurants in
public buildings, Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
bus terminals, Boynton v. Virginia, 364
U.S. 454 (1960); public schools, Brown v.
Board of Education [supra]; railroad dining-
car facilities, Henderson v. United States,
339 U.S. 816 (1950); state enforcement of
restrictive covenants based on race, Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); labor
unions acting as statutory representatives
of a craft, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., supra; voting, Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); and juries, Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). The
recognition of race as an absolute criterion
for granting transfers which operate only
in the direction of schools in which trans-
feree's race is in the majority is no less
unconstitutional than its use for original
admissions or subsequent assignment to
public schools. See Boson v. Rippy, 285
F.2d 43 (C.A. 5th Cir.).4 8
An Ohio federal court in 1964 related
the principle of color-blindness to the
problem of de facto segregation in edu-
cation:
In this cause of action the plaintiffs are
requesting the Court to do what the Con-
stitution forbids, that is, to recognize their
color and to order them admitted to a
school because of that color. Plaintiffs
have a constitutional right not to be ob-
jects of racial discrimination, and they can
vindicate that right in an action before this
Court, but they do not have a constitu-
tional right to attend or to refrain from at-
tending a particular school on the basis of
racial considerations when there has been
no actual discrimination against them. The
law is color-blind and, in cases such as this,
that principle, which was designed to in-
sure equal protection to all citizens, is both
a shield and a sword. While protecting
them in their right to be free from racial
discrimination, it at the same time denies
them the right to consideration on a racial
basis when there has been no discrimina-
tion.49
Clearly, then, the ultimate legitimacy of
racial balancing in the schools will depend
upon the choice that we as a society make
between the mutually exclusive goals of
color-blindness and color-consciousness. In
determining that choice, it will not be suf-
ficient to cite the rhetoric and holdings of
courts,"0 or the original intentions of the
41 Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 687-88
(1963). (Emphasis added.)
49 Lynch v. Kenston School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
229 F. Supp. 740, 744 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
50 The ability of local school authorities to con-
sider racial factors in zoning has received frank
recognition from some courts. "[A] local board
of education is not constitutionally prohibited
from taking race into account in drawing or
redrawing school attendance lines for the pur-
pose of reducing or eliminating de facto segrega-
framers of the fourteenth amendment. 51
Rather, because the matter is in such a
constitutionally plastic, formative state at
this time, with plausible arguments being
advanced on both sides, it is essential to
have recourse to the fundamental merits of
the question.
It is the opinion of the writer that the
policy of racial balancing in pupil assign-
ment to public schools is erroneous in the-
ory and pernicious in effect. The policy of
legal segregation, of "separate but equal"
facilities for the races, was, whatever its
constitutionality, self-defeating and degrad-
ing for citizens of all races. And, although
a decent regard for the essentials of our
system of divided powers would have
counselled, if not commanded, that the
elimination of the "separate but equal"
pattern be accomplished by constitutional
amendment rather than by judicial decree,
nevertheless we can all rejoice that our law
no longer countenances the institution of
legal segregation. A more difficult ques-
tion, however, is that of replacing the
"separate but equal" rationale with an
enduring principle of even-handed fairness.
Here, we ought to follow the suggestion of
tion in its public schools." Fuller v. Volk, 230 F.
Supp. 25, 34 (D.N.J. 1964); see also Balaban v.
Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1964), petition for cert. filed, 33
U.S.L. WEEK 3095 (U.S. Aug. 4,1964) (No. 350).
51The Supreme Court's assertion, in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954), that
the legislative history of the fourteenth amend-
ment is "inconclusive" on the question of segre-
gation in education, strains credulity, in view of
the contemporary prevalence of segregated
schools in the ratifying states and the District of
Columbia. At the least, no affirmative disposition
to eliminate segregated schools can be clearly
shown to have prevailed among the framers and
ratifiers of the amendment. See discussion in
Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of
"Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 131, 153-62 (1950).
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Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy v.
Ferguson,2 that "our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens." At this stage in
our societal and constitutional develop-
ment, we ought to realize that racial dis-
crimination is morally evil. This is un-
deniably true at least where such dis-
crimination is imposed 'by law. It is wrong,
not because it does not work, but because
it violates the equal dignity of all men be-
fore God and the law. What the racial bal-
ancers tell us, however, is that their brand
of discrimination, of racial classification, is
different, that it is good because they count
themselves as benevolent and because they
have in view an end, integration, which
they regard as a useful and even compel-
ling good. And they buttress their case by
the ready testimony of social scientists and
publicists who affirm, in learned terms, the
dangers of racial separation and the bene-
fits to all concerned which would arise
from compulsive commingling. 5
3
It does not unfairly dramatize the point
to observe that the racial theories which
prevailed in Nazi Germany were not lack-
ing pretentious support from social scien-
tists, and were of course legitimized as a
means to attain a desirable end. More-
over, tides and fads in the so-called social
sciences do ebb and flow.5 4 If the newly-
a2 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). "The Federal Con-
stitution is color blind. It is equally as unconsti-
tutional to discriminate against a white man as
it is to discriminate against a colored man .. "
Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157, 160 (E.D.
Va. 1963).
"'See Brown v. Board of Educ., supra note 51,
at 494-95 n.11.
54In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of
Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), a
United States District Court concluded that the
factual scientific testimony in that case, unlike
the testimony in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
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secured rights to racial justice under law
are to endure, they must be immunized
from any experimentation premised upon
the supposition that American citizens can
be legitimately divided and classified for
any reason on racial grounds.
Nor is racial balancing essential for the
improvement of public education. There is
no necessary correlation between integra-
tion as such and the quality of education
received in a school.,5 Indeed, a precipi-
tate pursuit of integration as a goal in itself
can inhibit the improvement of educational
standards.56 Moreover, there is reason to
believe that the shifting of pupils from one
school to another, especially in disregard of
the common-sense, racially neutral advan-
tages of neighborhood schools, can lead to
an increase in the rebellion and violence
which we have come to regard as ordinary
in some public school systems.57 When
showed that integration, not segregation, would
harm the children of both races. Therefore, the
court upheld a local system of segregated
schools. The decision was reversed on appeal
on the ground that, under the rule of Brown, a
court may now inquire into no substantive fact
other than the existence of legally segregated
public schools. Once that fact is found, a court
is not at liberty to reach an independent conclu-
sion as to the effect on children of segregated
schools. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd.
of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
"5 Kirk, The Chaos of Urban Schools, 16 NAT'L
REV. 495 (1964); Streit, Princeton's Lesson:
School Integration is Not Enough, N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1964, (Magazine), p. 14.
56 See discussion in Gibel, How Not to Integrate
the Schools, Harper's, Nov. 1963, p. 57.
57 Dr. Renatus Hartogs, chief psychiatrist of
Youth House, has observed, on this point, "We
feel that what we call 'geographical displace-
ments' creates feelings of insecurity in the child
as well as in parents. And many children react
to this apprehension they feel by becoming un-
necessarily aggressive. Hostility is their way to
master the fear that comes from the awareness
of a new, strange environment." N.Y. Journal-
American, Feb. 29, 1964.
racial balancing involves, as it inevitably
must, a compulsory movement of grade-
school children away from the public school
which otherwise would serve their normal
neighborhood, it does so at the expense
of a further weakening of that parental
supervision which is an important ingredi-
ent in the conduct of a primary school. It
represents, symbolically at least, a further
aggrandizement of the state, which thereby
asserts its primacy in the field of educa-
tion, a primacy which, not incidentally,
finds its expression in schools in which
there can be no official recognition that in
fact there is a divine standard of right and
wrong higher than the state itself.
But the basic objection to racial balanc-
ing does not depend upon the distances in-
volved. Rather, the vice is the classifica-
tion by race. Thus, the New York Court
of Appeals erred in Balaban v. Rubin 18 in
upholding the construction of a junior high
school on a site chosen to achieve racial
balance; the court was influenced by the
fact that no child assigned to the new
school lived closer to his "neighborhood"
school than he did to the new school. Ra-
cial classification must be rejected in prin-
ciple, regardless of distance or convenience,
or we shall embark upon a series of experi-
ments in which the only assurance against
oppressive discrimination, against white
and black, will be the self-restraint of the
balancers. Race, as religion, ought never
to be acknowledged as constituting in any
way a valid condition or measure, in this
nation, of a person's access to public facili-
ties, positions or activities of any sort.
Those who would make it such ought to be
rejected, whatever their intentions, with
the finality reserved for those who would
play God with the human race.
58 Supra note 50.
Interestingly, the entire concept of racial
balancing carries with it an inevitable im-
plication that Negroes are inferior. New
York State Commissioner of Education
James E. Allen's basic ruling of June 16,
1963 declared that racial imbalance in a
public school "intereferes with the achieve-
ment of equality of educational oppor-
tunity." He then stated that any school is
racially imbalanced if it has "50 per cent
or more Negro pupils enrolled."59
This standard implies that the presence
of white children automatically raises the
quality of a school and that a preponder-
ance of Negro pupils automatically lowers
it. The Negro is the only minority group
singled out for such treatment. Regardless
of its beneficent purpose, the ruling car-
ries the invidious implication that Negroes
necessarily tend to make a school inferior
and, therefore, that in some undefined way
Negroes are themselves inferior. It would
seem that this is as much a denial of the
Negro's equality under the law as are the
indefensible but less sophisticated racial
barriers in the South.
An open enrollment policy would be
preferable to racial balancing. A parent
ought to have the right to send his child to
any school with available space in his city
or school district. Concurrently, a priority
effort is needed to raise the standards of
schools in predominantly Negro and Puerto
Rican neighborhoods. If parents, what-
ever their race, choose not to send their
children to schools outside of their neigh-
borhood, they should not be compelled to
do so. Incidentally, there is evidence of
significant opposition among Negro parents
to racial balancing in the schools. For ex-
ample, a survey of the predominantly
50 N.Y. Times, June 19, 1963.
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Negro Bedford-Stuyvesant section of
Brooklyn, conducted by the chairman of
the local school board, revealed that:
Parents overwhelmingly expressed the feel-
ing that emphasis should be placed first on
the quality of education in the public
schools of the district. The parents made
it plain that they saw no reason why their
children had to be sent away from their
homes to another district to get a good
education. 0
Joseph P. Lyford, a staff member of
the Center for the Study of Democratic In-
stitutions, spent nearly a year in field work
for the Center in a forty-block area on the
upper West Side of Manhattan, after which
he reported that:
In my interviews over the past ten months
with low-income Negro and Puerto Rican
parents in the area, never once has the
question of racial percentages [in the
schools] been raised as a concern.
The parents' interests have been in the
type of teachers the children have, whether
the child seems to be benefiting by his
school experience, and the various facili-
ties the school has to offer both during and
after school hours.
All of this leads me to feel that there is a
considerable gap between the concerns of
the low-income Negro families in my area
and the avowed aims of various organiza-
tional leaders who presume to speak for
them."6
An open enrollment policy, where trans-
fer is up to the voluntary choice of the
parents involved, would seem to be con-
sistent with the constitutional standard of
color-blindness and would also provide an
60 N.Y. World Telegram & Sun, Jan. 29, 1964.
61 N.Y. Times, July 14, 1963; a survey con-
ducted by The New York Times among 190
Negroes revealed 46% in favor of busing to
achieve racial balance, 43% opposed, and 11%
not sure. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1964.
DE FACTO SEGREGATION
alternative for those parents who do not
desire their children to attend a neighbor-
hood school which they consider inferior.
62
At the same time, the energies and funds
which would be otherwise devoted to a
musical-chairs program of balancing could
be channeled into improving the faculty,
plant, basic instruction and discipline of
schools in deprived areas. Those schools
which are inferior should be the recipients
of preferential attention-not because they
are predominantly Negro or Puerto Rican,
if such be the case-but because they are
inferior.
Conclusion
The racial question has many aspects,
including the moral, economic, social and
political. The balancing technique, how-
ever, is a total assault upon a mere symp-
tom. Its indiscriminate compulsion in the
pursuit of arbitrary quotas, where volun-
tarism should be the norm, will engender
mutual resentment in place of cooperation.
In the pursuit of equal opportunity regard-
less of race, we should strive to avoid a
condescending racism-in-reverse that could
tend to regard minority groups as partial
wards of the state.
This discussion has centered, for pur-
poses of analysis, upon certain issues raised
62 See Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 229 F.
Supp. 580 (W.D. Tenn. 1964); see also Di Sano
v. Storandt, supra note 45, invalidating a so-
called open enrollment plan which actually pro-
vided for compulsory transfers.
by de facto segregation in education. But
the basic principles of color-blindness and
primary reliance upon voluntarism are rele-
vant to the areas of housing and employ-
ment as well. A discussion in detail of the
problems in those fields would unduly ex-
tend this study. Suffice it to say that, in
all racial problems, we ought to strive to
make equality of opportunity a fact while
avoiding a self-defeating resort to inverse
discrimination or pervasive compulsion. In-
deed, there are encouraging signs that prog-
ress can be made through the promotion of
voluntarism and color-.blindness in hous-
ing63 and employment6 4 without an im-
prudent resort to compulsory sanctions.6 5
It is fair to say that, in racial matters, we
shall see enduring progress and justice only
when there are brought to bear the volun-
tary resources of a free people, conceiving
the problems in their primary moral di-
mension, and assisted by a government
which unswervingly treats all men as equal
before the law, regardless of race, color or
national origin.
63 Fair housing committees can play an impor-
tant part here. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1963.
64 For example, the National Urban League,
despite an indefensible advocacy of preference
for Negroes, has, through its National Skills
Bank, provided Negro job applicants with a
means of improved access to major private busi-
nesses. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1964.
65 See Giaccone, Techniques of the New York
State Commission for Human Rights, 29 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 185 (1963).
